Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization

Title

Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization

Description

Human beings as objects, and we are objects inter alia, offer information, even knowledge. And yet, in a society marked by pervasive identity prejudice, even objects do not offer neutral facts. Here, I argue that the harms imposed on those who suffer testimonial injustices cannot be sufficiently understood through the ethical lens of objectification. Such persons are not simply objectified, not simply treated as mere sources of information rather than as informants. Even as objects (not mere objects), they are often unable to testify on their own behalf or testify to true facts of the matter. Rather than follow Miranda Fricker’s argument that testimonial injustices are acts of objectification, I argue that they are better understood as acts of what Ann Cahill calls derivatization. A re-examination of Fricker’s account of the wrong of testimonial injustice as derivatizing rather than objectifying clarifies the wrong of epistemic injustice, reinforces the mutuality of testimonial exchanges where both the speaker and listener are actively engaged and obligated to participate well to succeed, and opens up a discussion of how even when being treated as a source of information, informants can be mistreated.

Fresno State author

College or School

Department

Format

article

Citation Info

Cusick, C. M. (2019). Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization. Social Epistemology, 33(2), 111–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2019.1577919

Files

Cusick_p1.pdf

Citation

“Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization,” Outstanding Faculty Publications, accessed March 28, 2024, https://facpub.library.fresnostate.edu/items/show/35.